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Abstract. Previous attempts in designing interface agents have been concerned 
mainly with producing highly realistic-looking animations with emotions that 
are clearly recognizable. We argue that the choice of visual representation 
requires consideration of purpose-related psychological processes (i.e., theory 
of mind) in users. In an evaluation study, four synthetic characters ranging in 
appearance from non-human to very human (blob, cat, cartoon, human) were 
evaluated with respect to dispositional traits, mental states, as well as emotions. 
Results showed that the type of synthetic character strongly influenced what 
judgment was made. Whilst the blob and cat characters were well liked, 
attributions of intelligence, mind and complex emotions were found to be 
reserved more for the human-like counterparts. The findings suggest that 
independently of questions of realism and clarity of emotional signs, the design 
of interface agents should be based on attributions the type of character elicits 
and the function the character is to serve in a particular application. 
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1   Introduction 
The visual appearance of computer agents and avatars is a topic of particular interest 
in the fields of computer science and AI. For the user, the anthropomorphic 
embodiment of a program for interaction appears much more tangible than the “black 
box” or a computational device displaying printed text on a screen. As such, the 
personal nature of its appearance allows for it to be more approachable and life-like, 
thereby making it an immediate source of interaction. This is not just a question of 
liking; but it changes the social relationship between users and agents/bots. From 
previous research we know that people attribute personality traits and human 
characteristics to interface agents similarly as they might do to other people [1]. In 
this sense, users respond emotionally to it and treat it as a social agent [2]. 
Considering this personification process, attempts have been made to increase the 
humanness of agents and avatars by adding human-like attributes. The ultimate goal 
of such endeavors consists for many developers in the creation of synthetic digital 
humans with photorealistic faces that exhibit life-like behavior [3], [4]. However, for 
practical reasons approaches are limited with respect to the type of realism that can be 
achieved [5]. Specifically, the design of such embodiments is driven by system 
constraints regarding the spatial and temporal resolution devices presently afford, as 
well as conceptual considerations. For example, anthropomorphic representations 
with high fidelity may lead to alienation as a consequence of the “uncanny valley 
effect” [6], [7]. Applying Mori’s hypotheses which stem from a context in robotics to 
virtual agents one could argue that, if computer agents resemble humans too closely 
without making people fully believe that they are real, feelings of unpleasantness and 
uncanniness are triggered. In consequence, specific interactions might fail and users 
might try to avoid the “creepy” agent. To circumvent such pitfalls researchers have 
consequently chosen to implement the visual metaphor for their agents as cartoon-like 
humanoid characters, or animals, or animated objects, such as robots. 
 
With regard to what these agents show, there has been a particular interest in the 
emotional expression. Emotions reveal much of a character’s personality and 
influence the type and quality of interaction. For example, when users see a smiling 
agent they expect to have more enjoyable interactions compared to a non-smiling one 
[8]. The criterion here is typically whether an expression is recognized; this means 
whether a particular label, such as “happiness” is attributed to an entity when the 
designer intended to communicate this state. This concerns mainly how perceivers 
decode facial emotions, but it is not directly based on information on how senders 
would have encoded the expression in real life [9]. Furthermore, to maximize 
recognition, expressions are often not designed with ecological validity in mind. 
Thus, expressions correspond to stereotypical masks that are simplified in the type 
and quality of appearance. Mostly, these depict the six basic emotions (anger, fear, 
disgust, surprise, happiness, sadness) [10] and are displayed in a pure/exaggerated 
form [11]. Such expressions are well recognized because they function as clear 
representations of stereotypical emotion categories but they do not correspond to 
ecologically valid displays [12]. Furthermore, they do not necessarily capture the 
complexity of emotion attribution in the sense of what emotional states people really 
infer from the display [13]. 
 
Recent research in psychology may contribute in complicating the matter. Apparently, 
there is an interaction between how human we consider something and what mental 
and specifically emotional capacities we assume that “thing” to have [14], [15]. In 
other words, if something is less than human, we might not believe that it has the 
same mind a human has. Basic emotions, such as anger or happiness are easily 
attributed to animals, but more refined emotions, such as guilt or shame require more 
mind than we attribute to most animals [16]. Similarly, animated objects such as 
robots may remind of machines or automata and consequently lack emotions, 
cognitive flexibility and mind in the eye of the beholder. So what happens if agents 
range in appearance from highly anthropomorphic to cartoon-like or akin to animal, 
perhaps to escape the uncanny valley? Could it be that the type of representation 
affects perceivers in ways how (affectively) smart these beings are thought of? To 
elucidate such questions we conducted an evaluation study in which different types of 
visual agent representations – from non-human to very human - were presented. 
Depending on how closely the characters resemble humans, it was predicted that 
perceivers would make different attributions of dispositional traits, mental states and 
emotions. Furthermore, we investigated the effects of movement on characters’ 
evaluation. Since Mori [6], [7] made different predictions concerning the slope of the 
uncanny valley for static and moving displays, attributions should change as a 
function of the display condition. 
2   Evaluation Study 
The study involved forty participants (21 men, 19 women) aged between 18-35 years 
(M = 20.33, SD = 2.96) who participated on a voluntary basis from Cardiff 
University, UK. All were students or staff at the university and received £7.00 for 
their participation. Participants were presented with either static or dynamic displays 
of four embodied characters that differed in their degree of humanness: blob, cat, 
cartoon, and human (see Fig. 1). In the static condition, images of the characters in a 
neutral position were shown for 5 s. In the dynamic condition, each character 
consecutively displayed three types of movement – idle, bow, wave – which lasted 
about 10 s. All characters were displayed on blue background with an image size of 
490 x 270 pixels.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Four embodied characters – blob, cat, cartoon, human - from non-human to very human 
in a neutral position. 
Participants were tested individually on a PC workstation. After signing an informed 
consent form, they were told that they would see several animated characters that they 
should rate on a number of dimensions. It was made clear that there were no right or 
wrong answers. Rather, they should indicate their first impression. Using MediaLab 
2008 (Empirisoft) software, participants could initiate the stimulus sequence by using 
the mouse to click a start button on the computer screen. Each stimulus randomly 
appeared for 5 s (images) or 10 s (videos) and was prefaced by a rating dimension that 
was displayed throughout the stimulus presentation. After the stimulus disappeared, 
participants were instructed to respond to the rating scale.  
 
To allow for a varied nature in perception, we included a number of attributes that 
targeted dispositional traits, mental states as well as basic and social emotions. The 
following questions were answered on 7-point Likert-scales ranging from (1) not at 
all to (7) very much:  
• How likeable is the character? 
• How trustworthy is the character? 
• How intelligent is the character? 
• How engaging is the character? 
• To what degree does the character have a mind on its own? 
• To what degree can the character experience anger? 
• To what degree can the character experience shame? 
These questions were posed in random order, with one question per stimulus 
presentation. 
3   Results 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with condition (static, dynamic) and 
sex of participant (male, female) as between-subjects factors, and stimulus character 
(blob, cat, cartoon, human) as within-subjects factor was conducted on the seven 
dependent variables: likeable, trustworthy, intelligent, engaging, mind, anger, and 
shame. For all univariate analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment to degrees of 
freedom was applied. There were no significant effects associated with sex of 
participant, F(7, 30) = 0.98, p = .461, and this factor was dropped in all further 
analyses. As expected, the multivariate main effect of stimulus character was highly 
significant, F(7, 110) = 13.88, p = .000. Univariate tests showed significant effects for 
nearly all variables: likeable, F(2.56, 97.31) = 10.42, p = .000, trustworthy, F(2.87, 
109.11) = 6.68, p = .000, intelligent, F(2.79, 106.21) = 14.97, p = .000, engaging, 
F(2.54, 96.41) = 1.80, p = .160, mind, F(2.75, 104.65) = 6.96, p = .000, anger, F(2.93, 
111.32) = 15.98, p = .000, and shame, F(2.74, 104.32) = 5.26, p = .003.  
As can be seen in Fig. 2, for ratings of intelligence, the blob scored lowest 
and significantly different from the other characters (ps < .001). This was similar for 
attributions of mind in which the blob received lowest ratings which differed 
significantly from those of the cartoon (p = .037) and human character (p = .005). 
Furthermore, participants attributed less mind to the cat in comparison to the human 
character (p = .003). With respect to perceptions of anger, the cartoon character was 
judged to be most capable of experiencing anger with ratings significantly different 
from all other characters (ps < .01). Additionally, it was also perceived as least 
likeable and trustworthy, with ratings significantly lower than those of the remaining 
characters (ps < .05). The human character was perceived more capable to experience 
anger than the blob (p = .05). For ratings of shame, the human character scored 
significantly higher than both the blob (p = .004) and cat character (p = .010). 
 
Fig. 2. Mean ratings of the four characters for the seven dependent measures.
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4   Discussion  
Results showed that the attribution of dispositional traits, mental states, as well as 
basic and social emotions differed depending on the type of computer agent. Overall, 
the blob was well liked, but ratings of intelligence and mind were lowest for this type 
of character. Given that it was the most non-human and object-like looking, 
participants might have ascribed less mental capacities which are usually reserved for 
humans [14], [15]. This is also reflected by the finding that the cat as a living, but 
non-human being was seen to possess less mind than the human character. Thus, the 
human appearance seems to play a crucial role in what kind of attributions people 
make. If something is less than human we might not perceive it as having the same 
mind as a human. Moreover, such lower perceived ability to reason and mentalize is 
interlinked with how emotionally smart those characters are seen. Specifically, 
refined emotions such as shame require more mind than what is attributed to objects 
and most animals. Respective ratings of the present study corroborate that notion. 
Both the blob and cat character were judged as being least capable to experience 
shame. In comparison, ratings of shame and anger were highest for the human and 
cartoon character, indicating that participants perceived them as being most capable to 
experience complex emotional and mental states. 
 
For the proposed relation between human resemblance and perceiver’s affinity, Mori 
[6], [7] had made slightly different predictions for moving and static displays. In the 
current study, attributions of likeability and trustworthiness were moderated by the 
type of display condition. Interestingly, this effect occurred for the two characters 
being furthest away from the human endpoint (i.e, blob and cat). Given that bowing 
and waving were chosen as representation of dynamic displays, it is feasible that these 
typical human movements exerted their influence particularly in how non-human 
characters were perceived. This is an intriguing finding as it suggests that the slope of 
the uncanny valley may not only be sensitive to the presence of motion, but also to the 
type of movement and how closely it represents human-like behavior. 
5   Conclusion 
The findings have important implications for the design of anthropomorphic 
characters in the field of computer science and AI. Previous efforts have focused 
largely on issues such as realism and emotional clarity. In that context, attempts have 
been made in producing highly realistic-looking animations with emotions that are 
easily recognizable [3], [11]. We argue that the design of agents is not just an issue of 
realism but requires consideration of purpose-related psychological processes in 
users. There is more to designing an agent than optimizing for the practical 
constraints of a particular implementation and avoiding the uncanny valley. It does 
make a difference whether an agent looks like a human, or an animal. It would appear 
that likeability is an important point, but if the blob is likeable but stupid, it would not 
be a good idea to use the blob to provide feedback in a serious matter. If the cartoon 
character is intelligent, but not trustworthy, you would not want to use such a 
representation in a sales-type interaction. In other words, depending on the function 
that a particular agent has, the choice of visual representation should take into account 
issues such as what types of inferences regarding the cognitive and emotional 
intelligence it invites. Here a closer collaboration of psychologists and computer 
scientists and engineers can be particularly promising. It would be interesting to what 
degree such effects persist over longer periods of interaction, or to what degree users 
of different ages (e.g, children) or from different cultural background are susceptible 
to such effects. More research is needed regarding these issues. 
 
In psychology there is much research regarding Theory of Mind – this relates to the 
capacity of humans to imagine the thoughts and feelings of other humans [17]. When 
designing artificial interactants, whether embodied in the shape of robots, or virtual in 
the shape of agents, we must also consider the Theory of Mind the users are going to 
employ as a function of the design choices the engineers make [18], [19]. This study 
provides a pointer towards the type of evaluation studies that might be helpful in this 
context, but it is only a starting point towards the development of a systematic attempt 
to clarify criteria for development of artificial entities that can realize the 
communicative intent of its designers. 
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